Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 90
Issue 1 Shari'a and Halakha in North America

Article 5

1-30-2015

Operating Islamic Jurisprudence in Non-Muslim Jurisdictions:
Traditional Islamic Precepts and Contemporary Controversies in
the United States
Mustafa R. K. Baig
University of Exeter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Mustafa R. Baig, Operating Islamic Jurisprudence in Non-Muslim Jurisdictions: Traditional Islamic
Precepts and Contemporary Controversies in the United States, 90 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 79 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol90/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 47 Side A

01/14/2015 15:25:42

P04 - BAIG (WITH SIGNIFICANT CHANGES)(4).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/14/2015 9:16 AM

OPERATING ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN NON-MUSLIM
JURISDICTIONS: TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC PRECEPTS AND
CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES
MUSTAFA R. K. BAIG*
Fulfill your pledge, indeed the pledge will be asked of.
(Qur’an: 17:34)

When a noble person makes a promise, he honors it.
(Arabic/Sufi proverb attributed to ‘AlƯ Ibn AbƯ ৫Ɨlib)
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* Dr. Mustafa Baig is Research Fellow at the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Islamic
Studies.
1. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
2. Pierre Tristam, The Anti-Sharia Law Movement in the United States, ABOUT.COM,
http://middleeast.about.com/od/religionsectarianism/a/sharia-law-movement.htm (last visited Dec. 6,
2014).
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In 2010, Oklahoma voters supported a ballot measure banning state
courts from considering Islamic law or “Shari‘a”. The Tenth Circuit subsequently struck down the ban on the grounds that part of the ban singled out
Islamic law for special restriction and because lawmakers failed to identify
any instances where Islamic law caused an actual problem that the amendment sought to solve, and violated Muslims’ constitutional right to freedom
of religion.1 The “anti-Shari‘a movement,” however, gained ground in a
number of states by modifying the language into more legally acceptable
terms which prohibited courts from using foreign and international laws
more generally (with some specific exceptions).
Critics of the bills across the United States maintained that the revised
wording in the state bills simply provided a more nuanced cover for the
pre-existing motivation to stoke Islamophobic sentiments and stir antiMuslim prejudice. Some Republicans raised alarmist fears, such as Rick
Santorum’s comment that “terrorism is a tactic, not an ideology. But this
new existential threat to America, [Shari‘a] and its violent iteration jihadism, has yet to be adequately explained by our leaders”2 and Newt Gin-
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grich’s comment that “Shari‘a is a mortal threat to the survival of freedom
in the United States and in the world as we know it.”3
Such alarmist fear mongering present in the narrative—whether deliberate or made out of ignorance—mischaracterizes Shari‘a, both in regards
to the topic under contention and the essence of Shari‘a more broadly.4
These reductionist attitudes reflect complete disregard for the moral and
philosophical underpinnings and ethical considerations of the Shari‘a.5 The
linguistic meaning of Shari‘a (“pathway” or “path to a water hole”) serves
as a metaphor for its technical usage: just as water is essential for the vitality of human life, so is the Shari‘a for wayfarers traversing the journey of
life in this world. Muslims attempt to discover the dictates of Shari‘a (the
divine will of how they should live out their lives) through deep jurisprudential comprehension known as fiqh.6 Some aspects of this jurisprudence
have been singled out in these controversies, and it is one such aspect—the
Islamic jurisprudence concerning Muslims living in non-Muslim lands—
which will be the focus of this paper. In addition, part of the impetus driving the analysis is the absence of any informed discussion among politicians and anti-Shari‘a campaigners about what the Islamic legal tradition
actually says on the topic.7
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3. Abed Awad, The True Story of Shari’a in American Courts, THE NATION (July 2, 2012),
http://www.thenation.com/article/168378/true-story-Shari’a-american-courts#.
4. For some underpinning points on power, discourse and narrative (and what could be argued as
the historical roots of this narrative), see for example, Edward Said’s introduction to Orientalism.
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 1–28 (Penguin Books 2003) (1979) (and related works). For a refined
application of Said’s original thesis in a post-9/11 America, see HAMID DABASHI, POST-ORIENTALISM:
KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN TIME OF TERROR (2009). There is a burgeoning number of studies on
Orientalism and citizenship and interesting parallels can be drawn to the demonization of the Muslim
citizen of the United States. See Engin F. Isin, Citizenship after Orientalism: Genealogical Investigations, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL THOUGHT: THEORIZING PRACTICES (Michael Freeden & Andrew
Vincent eds., 2013); Engin F. Isin, Citizenship Without Nations, 30 ENV’T & PLAN. D: SOC’Y & SPACE
(2012) (for race being an important constitutive factor in constructions of citizenship).
5. To visit some of the recent academic expositions on this, see for example, Wael B. Hallaq,
Groundwork of the Moral Law: A New Look at the Qur’Ɨn and the Genesis of SharƯ‘a, 16 ISLAMIC LAW
& SOC’Y 239, 239–79 (2009).
6. It is in this sense that I use the term Islamic law (or jurisprudence). For more discussions on
Shari‘a, fiqh and other related matters, see the introduction of WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARƮ‘A: THEORY,
PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS (2009) and Norman Calder, Feqh, ENCYCLOPAEDIA IRANICA 504–11
(1999), available at http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/feqh#article-tags-overlay. Also useful is
Robert Gleave’s introduction in NORMAN CALDER, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE IN THE CLASSICAL ERA
(Colin Imber ed., 2010).
7. For more on Islamophobia and the anti-Shari‘a movement in the United States, see Wajahat
Ali et al., Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS,
(Aug. 26, 2011),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/report/2011/08/26/10165/fear-inc/. There have been a
number of responses and rebuttals to the anti-Shari‘a campaign in the United States from individuals
and organizations (both Muslims and non-Muslims alike). For some shorter statements, see Alicia Gay,
ACLU Lens: The Truth Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement, ACLU (Aug. 1, 2011),
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In examining the Islamic jurisprudence of Muslims living under nonMuslim rule, I will begin by looking at the rudimentary issue of how Muslim jurists viewed the actuality of Muslim individuals living in non-Muslim
jurisdictions. The ensuing question then, as discussed by jurists, is the relationship that a Muslim has to a Muslim polity, and the extent to which Islamic laws can be jurisdictionally extended and applied (if it all) to
Muslims living beyond the jurisdiction of Muslim territory (DƗr al-IslƗm).
The third section addresses that question by looking at the guidance that
Muslim jurists give to Muslims living in non-Muslim lands, in terms of
how they should organize their own legal affairs independent from Muslim
sovereignty. Particular attention is given to the appointment of Muslim
judges in non-Muslim lands.
For purposes of remaining within the natural constraints of the essay,
and also to provide readers with the authoritative weight of the tradition,
my focus is largely on the pre-modern Islamic legal tradition (specifically
the Sunni tradition).8 Part of the concluding comments will outline the
adaptability of the Islamic juristic tradition with the actual interaction of
“Shari‘a” with the contemporary American legal system.
I. MUSLIM MIGRATION (HIJRA) AND LIVING UNDER NON-MUSLIM
JURISDICTION

01/14/2015 15:25:42

https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-religion-belief/aclu-lens-truth-behind-anti-shariamovement; Usha Nellore, The So-Called Anti-Sharia Law Movement: A Chilling Example of the Paranoid Style in American Politics, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 28, 2011),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-08-28/news/bs-ed-sharia-law-20110828_1_anti-sharia-sharialaw-paranoid-style; The Anti-Sharia Campaign, JEWS AGAINST ISLAMOPHOBIA,
http://www.jewsagainstislamophobia.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09//Anti-Sharia-campaign.pdf (last
visited Dec. 10, 2014); Jesse Yurow, Anti-Sharia Legislation, JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE (Nov. 6, 2014),
http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/blog/national-anti-sharia-legislation (includes a number of useful links
here); and Rabbis & Synagogues Standing against Islamophobia, JEWISH VOICE FOR PEACE (Nov. 5,
2014), http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/blog/rabbis-synagogues-standing-against-islamophobia. There are
similar “anti-Shari‘a” trends in Canada and some European countries, although anti-Shari‘a campaigns
have not been as organized nor have they had the same impact in Europe.
8. That is within the four schools of Sunni jurisprudence, namely ণanafƯ, MƗlikƯ, ShƗfi‘Ư and
ণanbalƯ. Much of the focus will be on the ণanafƯ School (the largest of the four) for reasons that will
become apparent later.
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There are two main precedents from the Qur’an and Prophetic practice/Sunna (the two primary sources of Islamic law) relating to emigration.
The first precedent concerns the persecution of the early followers of the
Prophet, especially those of poorer classes. When the Prophet saw the affliction of his Companions (܇aۊƗba) intensify, he said to them, “If you
were to go to Abyssinia (it would be better for you), for the king will not
tolerate injustice and it is a friendly country, until such time as Allah shall
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9. MUHAMMAD IBN ISণƖQ, SƮRAT RASǋL ALLAH 146 (A. Guillaume trans., Oxford University
Press 2001). Negus (Arabic: al-NajƗshƯ), the king of Abyssinia was a devout Christian and a great
scholar of the revealed scriptures. He was recognized for his justice and tolerance. Aৢতama Ibn Abjar
(his proper name) later converted to Islam and died in 9 AH.
10. 1 MUHAMMAD AL-ZARQƖNƮ, SHARণ AL-MAWƖHIB AL-LADUNƮYA BI’L-MINAণ ALMUণAMMADƮYA 503–06 (1996) (Leb.); IBN ISণƖQ, supra note 9, at 148.
11. IBN ISণƖQ, supra note 9, at 198.
12. The one most frequently mentioned (known as the “hijra verse”) to determine the legal aspect
of migration reads:
Verily, those who are given death by the angels while they were wronging themselves, the
angels say to them: In what [plight] were you in? They reply: We were oppressed in the land.
They say: Was not the earth of Allah spacious enough for you to emigrate? Such people will
find their abode in Hell - what an evil refuge! Except the weak among men, women and children who have no means in their power nor have guidance to a way [to the land of migration].
For these, Allah will pardon them for Allah is most Pardoning and Forgiving. Whosoever em-
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relieve you from your distress.”9 Upon arrival, the Muslims engaged themselves in acts of worship and piety, living peacefully among their host
community. After some time, news had spread that the Meccan population
had converted to Islam. So some Companions of the Prophet returned to
Mecca, only to find that the news was untrue. Some Companions returned
again to Abyssinia, while others attempted and failed to conceal themselves. When they were found, they were persecuted and tortured more
than before. Hence, the Prophet again ordered them to leave for Abyssinia.10
In this first instance of migration, Muslims exercised self-exile in order to avoid persecution. But the next migration to take place was of a different nature. It was not voluntary as it was in the previous case but
obligatory, and the order to emigrate to Medina (known as Yathrib at the
time) was not only for a few Muslims, but for almost the entire Muslim
population of Mecca. A summarized description of the events is as follows:
members of the Aws and Khazraj tribes of Medina (who, although idolaters, kept close company with the Jews of Medina) converted to Islam
through visits to Medina where they heard verses of the Qur’an recited to
them by the Prophet, and through an emissary sent to them from Mecca.
The new Muslim community in Medina invited the Prophet there, taking an
oath that they would protect him with their lives. As Medina established
itself as a safe haven for Islam and Muslims, the Prophet permitted his
Companions to migrate to Medina. Gradually, all migrated except those
who were either imprisoned or did not have the financial means to do so.
In the year 622 (26th day of the Islamic month of Safar), the Prophet
left for Mecca. This event marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar and
the obligation on all the Companions to emigrate.11 There are numerous
verses in the Qur’an that discuss the hijra and extol the virtues of those that
migrate(d).12 Although it is not a like-for-like precedent, as the migration
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igrates in the cause of Allah will find plenty and spacious refuge. And he who leaves his
home emigrating toward Allah and His Messenger and death befalls him, then his reward is
certain with Allah and Allah is most Forgiving and Merciful.
Qur’an, 4:97–100 (translations of Qur’anic verses are my own).
13. 10 ABǋ BAKR MUHAMMAD IBN AণMAD AL-SARAKHSƮ, KITƖB AL-MABSǋ৫ 3 (n.d.) (Pak.).
14. See for example MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI’S SIYAR
(1966) and the Arabic edition by the same author MAJID KHADDURI, AL-QƖNǋN AL-DAWLƮ AL-ISLƖMƮ:
KITƖB AL-SIYAR LI’L-SHAYBƖNƮ (1975).
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that took place was from a non-Muslim land to another non-Muslim land
(Mecca at the time being a non-Muslim land, as was Medina), jurists did,
nevertheless, link the imperative to emigrate to Medina to the question of
whether it was permissible to reside in non-Muslim lands, and it results
from the fact that joining the Prophet in Medina meant the freedom to practice the Islamic faith without oppression.
Before looking at these legal discussions, it is important to comment
on where these discussions are located in the works of Islamic jurisprudence. The subject of Muslim relations with non-Muslims in classical legal
literature is primarily discussed under the heading of siyar (expeditions).
Muslim jurists defined the subject of siyar, not only as “ways” of conduct
of the warriors and what is incumbent on them and for “them,” but also as
governing relations with a wide spectrum of groups ranging from unbelievers and apostates to those with whom treaties have been made.13 Some
writers, aiming to find an analogous term, have rendered siyar into English
as Islamic international law or the Islamic law of nations.14
Sometimes, the terms siyar and jihad are grouped together to form a
heading. The impression that Muslim/non-Muslim relations are confined to
military struggle seems to be confirmed by both the content and titles of
this section of jurisprudence. The section has subsections that largely cover
aspects of warfare, imamate (leadership in war), taxation, treaties, spoils of
war, rebels and apostasy. Perhaps the reason such headings dominate the
kitƗb, or bƗb, is that the early contact between Muslims and non-Muslims
was largely by virtue of warfare, actual or potential. Hence, Muslim jurists
bifurcated the world into two realms: DƗr al-Islam (abode or territory of
Islam) and DƗr al-ۉarb (territory of war), reflecting the historical reality of
the time. This feeds the impression that jurists only discussed jihad and the
relationship with non-Muslims in reference to military struggles against the
enemy. Although the term DƗr al-ۉarb literally means “Abode of War,” it
does not refer to a perpetual state of physical war, nor—as we shall see—
does it preclude the possibility of peaceful Muslim abidance in non-Muslim
territory. Furthermore, non-Muslim territory was sometimes designated as
dƗr al-muwƗda‘a, ܈ulۊ, hudna (muhƗdana) or ‘ahd if DƗr al-Islam had
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entered into a peace treaty or truce with DƗr al-ۉarb.15 Muslim scholars
viewed peace settlements as “jihad in meaning” because the purpose of
jihad is to actualize peace and repel evil that result from continued hostilities, and this is what “serves the interests of Muslims.”16
Nonetheless, Abǌ ণanƯfa (the eponym of the ণanafƯ School, d.
150/767) reportedly disapproved of Muslims residing in non-Muslim territories. Under the heading of “Muslims entering DƗr al-ۉarb with a security covenant (amƗn) for trade,” Abǌ ণanƯfa’s opinion is relayed when he is
asked by his pupil about marriage with People of the Book:17
I asked: What is your opinion of a Muslim who enters non-Muslim territory under an amƗn and marries from among the inhabitants of that territory who is from the People of the Book?
Abǌ ণanƯfa replied: I disapprove of his doing so.
I asked: But if he marries, would such a marriage be valid?
He replied: Yes.
I asked: Then, why did you disapprove of it?
He replied: Because I disapprove of his living in it.18

Muhammad al-ShaybƗnƯ (d. 189/805)—who is among two of Abǌ
ণanƯfa’s most widely cited students—gives his opinion in regards to a person that converts to Islam in non-Muslim territory. He states that the duty
to migrate to the land of Islam after conversion, according to the majority
of scholars, was abrogated at the time of the Prophet in Medina. In support
of that assertion, he cites the narration of the Prophet: “There is no migration [required] after the conquest of Mecca.”19
The renowned Transoxanian ণanafƯ jurist and redactor of al-ShaybƗnƯ,
al-SarakhsƯ (referred to as shams al-a’imma, or “sun of the leading schol35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 49 Side B
01/14/2015 15:25:42

15. Such an agreement and recognition by the Muslim land of these regions was sometimes in
return for a tributary tax (jizya), exercising a type of suzerainty over them (although, according to
prominent jurists, wealth should only be taken when the Muslims are in a state of need). The default
position, however, was that they were DƗr al-ۉarb (and these terms are often used in conjunction with
and understood as derivatives of ڱƗr al-ۉarb). DƗr al-Kufr (abode of non-belief) and ڱƗr al-ۉarb are
used interchangeably but sometimes DƗr al-Kufr is distinguished from DƗr al-ۉarb as simply a land of
non-Muslims as opposed to one hostile to Muslim lands (muۊƗrib). See Qur’an, 8:56–61. Some modern
Muslim reformers advocate the reconceptualizing of these categories to reflect their perception of the
modern world order. Also see KHADDURI, supra note 14 (translator’s introduction); Mohammed Fadel,
History of Islamic International Law, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT’L L. (2010), available
at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/Fadel/Max_Planck_Final.pdf.
16. 2 BURHƖN AL-DƮN ABǋ AL-ণASAN ‘ALƮ AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, AL-HIDƖYA SHARণ BIDƖYAT ALMUBTADƮ 138-139 (n.d.) (Egypt).
17. People of the Book (Ahl al-KitƗb) refers to Jews and Christians (or those that have belief in
divine scripture).
18. MUHAMMAD IBN AL-ণASAN AL-SHAYBƖNƮ, AL-QANǋN AL-DAWLƮ AL-ISLƖMƮ: KITƖB ALSIYAR LI’L-SHAYBƖNƮ 191 (M. Khadduri ed., 1975).
19. Mentioned in a number of places in all major collections under the chapters of Pilgrimage,
Jihad, Siyar and Expeditions of the Prophet (MaghƗzƯ).
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20. Transmitted reports of Prophetic practice/sayings (Sunna).
21. 1 MUHAMMAD IBN AণMAD ABǋ BAKR AL-SARAKHSƮ, SHARণ AL-SIYAR AL-KABƮR 271–72
(1958); 10 AL-SARAKHSƮ, supra note 13, at 8–9.
22. 15 BADR AL-DƮN ABǋ MUHAMMAD MAণMǋD IBN AণMAD AL-‘AYNƮ, ‘UMDAT AL-QƖRƮ
SHARণ ৡAণƮণ AL-BUKHƖRƮ 18 (2003) (Leb.).
23. NA‘ƮM AL-DƮN AL-MURƖDƖBƖDƮ, KHAZƖ’IN AL-‘IRFƖN FƮ TAFSƮR AL-QUR’ƖN 4:97 123 (n.d.)
(Pak.) (known as ۉƗshiya Kanz al-ࠂmƗn, a marginalia on Aতmad RiঌƗ (RazƗ) KhƗn al-BarƝlwƯ alHindƯ’s translation of the Qur’an).
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ars” (d. 499/1106)), commenting al-ShaybƗnƯ’s opinion, stated that the
migration was obligated in the Qur’anic verse (cited above) because the
Muslims were living under oppression and the obligation would continue to
the Day of Judgment if such a cause (sabab) is found. On the other hand, if
such a sabab is not found, and Muslims can live honorably, then the obligation to migrate is lifted. Hence, the majority of scholars conceived hijra as
ending with the conquest of Mecca in accordance to the Hadith20—that
“there is no hijra after the conquest.”21 Similarly, the great Egyptian traditionalist and jurist, Badr al-DƯn al-‘AynƯ (d. 855/1453), commenting on the
Hadith, mentions that Muslims fled with their religion towards Allah and
His Messenger for fear of enticement away from Islam, and in his time
(already), he noted, Muslims are able to worship their Lord wherever they
desire.22 As well as the Prophetic narration, the ণanafƯ jurists looked at the
operative cause (illa) in the obligation to migrate away from non-Muslim
lands. Although Abǌ ণanƯfa’s opinion does not contradict that of his followers, if one did attempt to reconcile any apparent difference, one could
argue that Abǌ ণanƯfa’s opinion considered the question of Muslims residing in non-Muslim lands with the operative cause in place. Later scholars
clarified and elaborated his view by mentioning that if Muslims did not
find themselves being oppressed or persecuted, then they could remain in
non-Muslim territory.
One should also bear in mind that Abǌ ণanƯfa merely disapproved of
Muslims living in non-Muslim lands—he did not forbid it. Other scholars
elaborated on the implicit concern in Abǌ ণanƯfa’s statement as to whether
or not it was possible for Muslims living in non-Muslim lands to carry out
their religious duties. Moreover, this conceptual continuity was expressed
by the late ণanafƯ scholar (and exegete) from India, Na‘Ưm al-DƯn
MurƗdƗbƗdƯ (d. 1948/1367), as he commented on the verse of obligation
that “if a Muslim is residing in a land where he is unable to perform his
religious obligations (farƗ’i)ڲ, and is aware of a land where he can practice
his faith, then it is obligatory (wƗjib) that he performs migration to that
land.”23 The important condition of having knowledge of a land where he
can practice his faith without difficulty is added.
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24. 4 ABǋ ‘ABDULLƖH MUHAMMAD IBN IDRƮS AL-SHƖFI‘Ʈ, AL-UMM 161 (Leb.); K. Abou El
Fadl, Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities, in 1 ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY 146–47 (Brill & Leiden
1994).
25. 3 ABǋ DƖWǋD SULAYMƖN IBN AL-ASH‘ATH, SUNAN 93 (n.d.) (Hadith report 2787).
26. 3 ABǋ ‘SƖ MUHAMMAD IBN ‘ƮSƖ AL-TIRMIDHƮ, AL-JƖMI‘ 80–81 (1980) (Leb.) (Hadith report
1655). See also 2 ABǋ ‘ABDULLƖH AL-ণƖKIM AL-NƮSHƖPǋRƮ, AL-MUSTADRAK 154 (2002) (Leb.)
(Hadith report 2627).
27. 3 AL-TIRMIDHƮ, supra note 26, at 80 (Hadith report 1654); see also 3 IBN AL-ASH‘ATH, supra
note 25 (Hadith report 2645).
28. See Muhammad Khalid Masud, The Obligation to Migrate: The Doctrine of ‘Hijra’ in Islamic
Law, in MUSLIM TRAVELLERS, PILGRIMAGE, MIGRATION AND THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION 33 (Dale
Eickelman and James Piscatori eds., Univ. of California Press 1990) (citing 6 IBN ণAJAR AL‘ASQALƖNƮ, FATণ AL-BƖRƮ SHARণ ৡAণƮণ AL-BUKHƖRƮ 378 (1959)).
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The ShƗfi‘Ư School seems to be unified in their position. Muhammad
Ibn IdrƯs al-ShƗfi‘Ư (d. 204/820) argued that, even after the establishment of
the Islamic rule in Medina, ‘AbdullƗh Ibn ‘AbbƗs and other Companions
were allowed to reside in Mecca (then a non-Muslim territory). Additionally, the Prophet allowed nomadic tribes that converted to Islam to remain
outside the domains of the lands of Islam. The Prophet, according to alShƗfi‘Ư, would not have given these people a choice of residence if it were
sinful for them to retain their independence. Consequently, Muslims who
convert in non-Muslim lands may reside there unless they fear enticement
away from Islam.24
Other Hadith narrations indicate that the Prophet forbade Muslims
from living with non-Muslims. Abǌ DƗwǌd, in his Sunan relates,
“[W]hoever joins a polytheist and lives with him is like him.”25 The narration could refer to Muslims residing in the dwellings of non-Muslims (as
the pronouns used are all in the singular), but Abǌ DƗwǌd’s placing of the
narration under the heading “living in the lands of shirk” rules this out, at
least according to him. A similar narration is mentioned by al-TirmidhƯ
(with plural pronouns) under the heading of “the disapproval [karƗhƯya] of
residing among polytheists.”26 Under the same heading, another report
states, “I disavow myself of every Muslim who settles among the polytheists.”27
There does seem to be some difference of opinion among the scholars
in how these narrations should be interpreted. For example, Al-Kha৬৬ƗbƯ (d.
388/988), an early Hadith commentator, reconciled the differences of opinion by arguing that hijra was actually meant to support and strengthen the
DƗr al-IslƗm in its nascent days. After the conquests, DƗr al-IslƗm was so
strong and established that migration was no longer required. The hijra
would only be required again when the conditions so demanded.28 Ibn
ণajar al-‘AsqalƗnƯ (d. 852/1448)—among the foremost Hadith commentators and a jurist of the ShƗfi‘Ư school—analyzed the legality of Muslims
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29. 6 AণMAD IBN ‘ALƮ IBN ণAJAR AL-‘ASQALƖNƮ, FATণ AL-BƖRƮ SHARণ ৡAণƮণ AL-BUKHƖRƮ
209–10 (n.d.) (Egypt).
30. Qur’an, supra note 12; 8 MUWAFFAQ AL-DƮN ‘ABDULLƖH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN QUDƖMA,
AL-MUGHNƮ 456–58 (1948) (Egypt). Ibn ণajar’s discussion (supra note 29) appears as a shortened (and
slightly modified) version of Ibn QudƗma’s text. It may well be that Ibn QudƗma has embraced this
from an early writer.
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residing in a non-Muslim land and discussed conditions that would permit
them to reside there. He stated: (i) if a Muslim has the means to emigrate
from non-Muslim lands, and it is not possible for him to manifest his faith
nor can he perform his obligatory duties, then emigration from there is
obligatory upon him; (ii) if he has the means to emigrate but it is possible
for him to manifest his faith and perform his obligatory duties then it is
preferable to emigrate so that he may strengthen and assist the Muslims,
engage in jihad, and that he is secure from their deception and is at peace
from seeing evil (munkar); (iii) he is unable to emigrate due to captivity or
illness, for example, then he is permitted to reside there.29
The ণanbalƯ scholar, Muwaffaq al-DƯn Ibn QudƗma (d. 620/1223),
classifies the ruling on emigration into the same three categories. Again, he
refers to the hijra verse cited above.30
In looking at the Qur’anic verses, the Prophetic narrations, and the
analyses of the jurists/Hadith scholars, the concept of hijra was understood
to be linked to the freedom of worship and to strengthening the new Muslim community. The migration of the Prophet and his Companions took
place to a land where Muslims could practice their religious rites unreservedly and from a land where they were persecuted for doing so. The juristic
schools do not differ to any great extent with respect to this issue. In fact,
the approach of the ণanafƯs, ShƗfi‘Ưs and ণanbalƯs is near identical. In
terms of permanent residence in non-Muslim lands, the ShƗfi‘Ư and ণanbalƯ
view, that migration to Muslim lands is preferable, can be analogized with
Abǌ ণanƯfa’s view of disfavoring residence.
The MƗlikƯ School, on the other hand, differed considerably with their
counterparts. MƗlik Ibn Anas (d. 179/795) strongly disapproved of Muslims even traveling to non-Islamic territory for purposes of trade, let alone
for permanent residence. When one of MƗlik’s students, Ibn al-QƗsim (d.
191/806), was asked by ‘Abd al-SalƗm Saতnǌn (d. 240/855) whether MƗlik
disapproved of merchants traveling to non-Muslim territory for the purpose
of conducting business, Ibn al-QƗsim responded, “Yes, MƗlik would disapprove of it strongly [karƗhƯya shadƯda], and he used to say, ‘they should
not go to their lands where they will become subject to the laws of polythe-
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ism [aۊkƗm al-shirk].’”31 MƗlik’s view is the strictest, and seems to defy
the social and historical practice of Muslim traders who, at the time, were
traveling to non-Muslim lands in large numbers. As well as his concern for
Muslims being subject to non-Muslim law in general, he is concerned more
specifically with financial transactions being governed by non-Muslim
rules (considering he is being asked about traders). Later MƗlikƯ scholars,
such as the Andalusian Ibn Rushd (d. 520/1126) and the North African alWansharƯsƯ (d. 914/1508), continued to propagate the same position, albeit
with some scholars taking limited exceptions.32
II. MUSLIMS ENTERING DƖR AL-HARB UNDER A SECURITY COVENANT
(AMƖN) FOR TRADE
Addressing Muslims in foreign lands as merchants was a particularly
pertinent consideration for Muslim jurists, as trading was an important
feature of Arab society even before the advent of Islam. Arab trade in the
Malabar region of coastal India, South East Asia and East Asia is welldocumented,33 and those travels continued throughout the era of the Prophet and the early caliphate.34 As such, trade naturally played an important
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31. 10 ‘ABD AL-SALƖM IBN SA‘ƮD SAণNǋN, AL-MUDAWWANA AL-KUBRƖ 102 (1905) (Egypt).
The fact that it is the opening passage in the chapter on “Travelling to the Enemy’s Land for Trade” is
instructive of his attitude toward Muslims traveling to non-Muslims lands.
32. MUHAMMAD IBN AণMAD IBN RUSHD, KITƖB AL-MUQADDIMƖT AL-MUMAHHIDƖT 611–12
(1970) (Iraq); 2 AণMAD IBN YAণYƖ AL-WANSHARƮSƮ, AL-MI‘YƖR AL-MU‘RIB 119–38 (1981) (Morocco). Also see 1 IBN ‘ABD AL-BARR AL-QUR৫UBƮ, KITƖB AL-KƖFƮ FƮ FIQH AHL AL-MADƮNA AL-MƖLIKƮ,
370 (1980) (Saudi Arabia). There is some flexibility in the view of Abǌ Bakr Ibn al-‘ArabƯ (d.
543/1148). Some of these positions were, in part, driven by political circumstances on the ground. I
intend to take up the views of MƗlikƯ scholars in a future article.
33. Hermanus J. de Graff, South-East Asian Islam to the Eighteenth Century, in 2A THE
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM 123 (P. M. Holt, A. K. S. Lambton & B. Lewis eds., 1984); IRA
LAPIDUS, A HISTORY OF MUSLIM SOCIETIES 383 (2002); JONATHAN N. LIPMAN, FAMILIAR
STRANGERS: A HISTORY OF MUSLIMS IN NORTHWEST CHINA 24–31 (1997). Muslim merchants and
political emissaries travelled as far as China during and after the caliphate of ‘UthmƗn Ibn ‘AffƗn
(24/644-35/656). Popular stories that the venerated Companion Sa‘d Ibn AbƯ WaqqƗs (with some
Companions) sailed to China from Abyssinia (whist in asylum) in 616 and later again leading an envoy
in 650 (or other varying dates) are not corroborated by Muslim sources or Western historians. Similar
can be said of the story of a supposed Companion named MƗlik Ibn DƯnƗr entering Kerala in India and
converting the king to Islam. MƗlik Ibn DƯnƗr is actually a name of a person from the third generation
of Muslims renowned for his knowledge and asceticism. Nevertheless, while the details surrounding
MƗlik Ibn DƯnƗr may be mythical, the conversion of an Indian king from that region has been linked to
a Hadith (of questionable authenticity) in which the king gifted a jar of ginger pickle to the Prophet. 4
AL-ণƖKIM, supra note 26 at 150 (Hadith report 7190). There is also mention in some biographical
works of the Prophet (sƯra).
34. Not to mention that the Prophet himself went on trade journeys before declaring his
prophethood and married the successful merchant KhadƯja who he married after successfully and honestly trading on her behalf. In one tradition, for example, the Prophet is reported to have said: “[The
status of the] truthful, trustworthy merchant is among the Prophets, the truthful, and the martyrs.” 2 ALTIRMIDHƮ, supra note 26 at 341–42 (Hadith report 1227). Other sources included slightly different
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words (Truthful and Trustworthy were two honorific titles the Prophet himself earned before declaring
Prophethood due to his dealings with the Arabs and conduct in trade).
35. See, e.g., 2 MAURICE LOMBARD, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ISLAM (Joan Spencer trans., NorthHolland Medieval Translations 1975) (providing more information on trade in early Islam).
36. There are exceptions such as al-Mudawwana cited above. 3 IBN SA‘ƮD SAণNǋN, supra note
31. This may seem somewhat ironic given the MƗlikƯ attitude toward Muslims trading in non-Muslim
lands.
37. ABǋ AL-ণASAN AণMAD IBN MUHAMMAD AL-BAGHDƖDƮ AL-QUDǋRƮ, AL-MUKHTAৡAR LI’LQUDǋRƮ 296 (n.d.) (Pak.).
38. 2 ABǋ BAKR IBN ‘ALƮ AL-ণADDƖD AL-YAMƖNƮ, AL-JAWHARAT AL-NAYYIRA ‘ALƖ
MUKHTASAR AL-QUDURI 373 (n.d.) (Pak.); 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 152.
39. Id.
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role in the propagation of Islam outside the Arabian Peninsula.35 Thus, it is
understandable why the earliest Islamic jurists addressed Muslim traders in
non-Muslim lands. This socio-economic phenomenon required legal rules
to deal with the various particulars, even if that entailed devising hypothetical (albeit, purposeful) scenarios comparable to the discourse adopted in
other areas within jurisprudence. No independent heading was usually designated for the Muslim trader in legal texts.36 Nevertheless, Muslim traders
are mentioned in the discussion of isti’mƗn (claiming a security covenant),
under the section of siyar (jihad), referring to a situation where a Muslim
enters non-Muslim lands with a security covenant. This shows that one
could in fact enter DƗr al-ۉarb in a peaceful state. Therefore, one cannot
exclusively ascribe the connotation of war or belligerence to DƗr al-ۉarb.
The issue of Muslims entering non-Muslim lands for trade purposes
is addressed in a renowned standard text (matn) of the ণanafƯ School, alMukhta܈ar li’l-QudǌrƯ, which summarizes the authoritative legal views of
the School. It states the following: “If a Muslim enters DƗr al-ۉarb as a
trader, it is not permitted for him to infringe on their property and life.”37 In
their commentaries on this statement, BurhƗn al-DƯn al-MarghƯnƗnƯ (d.
593/1197) and Abǌ Bakr al-YamƗnƯ (d. 800/1397) explain that this is because a Muslim is duty-bound to abide by the security covenant; any infringement after obtaining it is a violation of the law (ghadar), and
violation of the law is forbidden (haram).38 This is contrary to a prisoner of
war, even one that is freed willingly, as he is not under a security covenant.
Al-MarghƯnƗnƯ also adds that, if the contract is contravened by the nonMuslim sovereign or by the consent of the sovereign, then he is no longer
responsible for upholding the covenant.39
In sum, Muslim jurists prohibited any kind of deceit in financial dealings or breaking of local law in DƗr al-ۉarb. Such rulings dismiss the notion that Islam only permits hostile relations to exist between Muslims and
non-Muslims. Upon the obtaining of a security covenant (and paying mutu-
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40. The inverse case of a non-Muslim musta’min entering Muslim territory is also discussed
under this section, again signifying the provision in the law of a means of peaceful existence between
Muslims and non-Muslims.
41. 4 ‘ABD AL-GHANƮ AL-MAYDƖNƮ, AL-LUBƖB FƮ SHARণ AL-KITƖB 134–35 (n.d.) (Leb.). The
words in parentheses are MaydƗnƯ’s own words.
42. ABǋ AL-ণASAN ‘ALƮ IBN MUHAMMAD AL-MƖWARDƮ, AL-AণKƖM AL-SUL৫ƖNƮYA 141 (1973)
(Egypt).
43. Id. Al-MƗwardƯ (a ShƗfi‘Ư jurist), in his book on the regulations of governance, mentions
difference of opinion among the jurists if any exists. Here he only mentions DƗwǌd (founder of the
minority, now extinct, ƗhirƯ School) as the only person to differ.
44. Id.
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al observance to it), Islamic law does not allow a person to break any part
of the law, let alone attack the property and persons living there.
It is interesting to note that al-MarghƯnƗnƯ and other jurists allocate a
separate subheading (bƗb) for the musta’min (he who claims a security
covenant) within the KitƗb al-Siyar/JihƗd. This indicates that the jurists
distinguished between the ways to enter non-Muslim lands (DƗr al-ۉarb):
one way was through military expeditions, and the other was through
peaceful means such as trade. Both types are discussed under siyar/jihad.40
Later scholars have added other generic means of entry into the Abode of
War, over and above trade, without specifying what these might be. For
example, al-MaydƗnƯ, in his gloss on the al-QudǌrƯ text above, stated that,
“[I]f a Muslim enters DƗr al-ۉarb by way of trade (or other means) it is
not permitted for him to infringe on their property and life.”41 This suggests
that al-QudǌrƯ was not intending to limit purposes of travel to trade only,
or, from a legal-historical point of view, it perhaps indicates and acknowledges a diversification in reasons why Muslims were traveling to nonMuslim lands. In other words, “trade” is not a precluding qualification
(qayd iۊtirƗzƯ) but an incidental one (qayd ittifƗqƯ/wƗqi‘Ư).
The obligation to uphold the security covenant is expressly mentioned
by al-MƗwardƯ (d. 448/972), who states that, “[a] Muslim who enters DƗr
al-ۉarb with a security covenant or is taken captive but then freed and
given a security covenant is not permitted to attack them or their property,
and has to guarantee them quarter.”42 Al-MƗwardƯ states this without mentioning any difference among the four schools of law, pointing towards
unanimity among the established schools on this issue.43 It is worth mentioning here that, in contrast to the ণanafƯ texts, MƗlikƯ texts after alMudawwana appear to devote less attention to the case of a person claiming a security covenant or a Muslim trader in non-Muslim lands. This is
probably because the MƗlikƯ School was much more reluctant to permit
Muslims to travel to non-Muslim lands in the first place.44 However, the
agreement of the jurists, if such a contract is made, still stands.
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III. THE JURISDICTION OF DƖR AL-ISLƖM (THE ABODE OF ISLAM) IN
NON-MUSLIM TERRITORY
Given the obligation to abide by the security covenant, the jurists then
had to address what type of law should apply if a Muslim contravened the
law of the land. Essentially, this is a type of choice-of-law question. And in
Islamic law, it involved defining the extent of DƗr al-IslƗm’s territorial
jurisdiction. The ণanafƯs hold that Muslim jurisdiction cannot extend to
non-Muslim territory. Abǌ ণanƯfa is reported to have responded to the
question of crimes committed in non-Muslim territory and which system of
punishment is applicable in the following conversation:
I said: What is your opinion about this, that someone who goes in
amongst them [in DƗr al-ۉarb] with a security covenant, and if then
kills one of their men in DƗr al-ۉarb, or seizes property or a slave and
takes it to DƗr al-IslƗm, then the inhabitants of [DƗr al-] Harb convert to
Islam or become a Protected Community [dhimma],45 would you return
to them any of what this [person] took, or is there any liability for any of
[the victim’s] wealth or blood?
He said: No.
I said: Why?
He said: Because he carried out this act in DƗr al-ۉarb, where rules for
Muslims are not applicable.
I said: Would you disapprove of this [action] of the man?
He said: Yes—I would disapprove of it for him on the grounds of his religion to act perfidiously towards them.46

01/14/2015 15:25:42

45. Ahl al-Dhimma are non-Muslim subjects of DƗr al-IslƗm whose safety and protection is the
responsibility of the sovereign in return for paying jizya (tributary tax).
46. AL-SHAYBƖNƮ, supra note 18, at 194.
47. 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, BIDƖYAT AL-MUBTADƮ 153 (n.d.) (Egypt) (printed with its commentary
al-HidƗya by the same author supra note 16. Although al-HidƗya is a commentary on his own work,
BidƗyat al-MubtadƯ, it is practically a commentary on al-QudǌrƯ’s Mukhta܈ar (Epitome) but with a
limited number of changes and additions to the original included from al-JƗmi‘ al-SaghƯr of alShaybƗnƯ (or from elsewhere if necessary). See MUHAMMAD ‘ABD AL-ণAYY AL-LAKHNAWƮ, ALFAWƖ’ID AL-BAHƮYA FƮ TARƖJIM AL-ণANAFƮYA 140 (Leb.) (although I have added some observations
of my own here). Interestingly, this passage is not found in al-QudǌrƯ’s text but al-MarghƯnƗnƯ has
added it in his own Mukhta܈ar because he must have considered its inclusion important. 1 ‘ABDULLƖH
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Behind this discussion lies a larger concept of the inviolability and
protection of life and property. The ণanafƯ jurists discussed the issue of a
Muslim in non-Muslim lands who loans money or property (on credit) to a
non-Muslim or is loaned something by a non-Muslim. If the two return to
DƗr al-IslƗm, and one of them files a suit against the other in an Islamic
court, then the Islamic sovereign (ۊƗkim or qƗڲƯ) will not decree anything
in this regard. The same applies if one embezzles the property of the other
(gha܈b).47 The jurists maintain that wilƗya, or jurisdiction, is a requisite for
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the enforcement of a decree.48 In this case, the judge did not have jurisdiction at the time the debt took place (lƗ wilƗyata waqt al-iddƗna a܈lan)49 as
the qƗڲƯ is not able to adjudicate on those who are in DƗr al-ۉarb.50 The
jurists also add that, at the time of adjudication (qaڲƗ’), the judge does not
hold jurisdiction over the non-Muslim since the individual had not committed himself to the jurisdiction of Islam in the past (maڲƗ), when the act had
been carried out, but rather had committed himself to what will take place
in the future (mustaqbal).51 Nevertheless, the qƗڲƯ will issue a fatwa to the
Muslim, stating that the property owed or embezzled should be returned;
this is not a legally binding decree that will enforce the return of property
but rather a verdict that states his religious obligation to abide by the
amƗn.52 KamƗl al-DƯn Ibn al-HumƗm (d. 861/1457) adds that although the
state will not enforce the return of the property, the fatwa will state that it is
obligatory (wƗjib) to return it, as the matter remains between him and
God.53 Here, we see the difference between a legal obligation (in terms of a
state injunction) and a religious and moral obligation to return the property.
On the issue of owed property, the same ruling is given if two nonMuslims from non-Muslim territory file a case in DƗr al-IslƗm. This is due
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IBN AণMAD IBN MAণMǋD AL-NASAFƮ, KANZ AL-DAQƖ’IQ 593–94 (2004) (Pak.); 6 MUHAMMAD IBN
‘ABDULLƖH AL-TAMARTƖSHƮ, TANWƮR AL-ABৡƖR 276 (2003) (Leb.) (printed with its commentary 6
MUHAMMAD ‘ALƖ AL-DƮN AL-ণASKAFƮ, DURR AL-MUKHTƖR SHARণ TANWƮR AL-ABৡƖR (2003) (Leb.)
and supercommentary 6 SAYYID MUHAMMAD AMƮN IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, RADD AL-MUণTƖR ‘ALƖ DURR ALMUKHTƖR SHARণ TANWƮR AL-ABৡƖR (2003) (Leb.) (al-QudǌrƯ’s Mukhta܈ar and al-NasafƯ’s Kanz alDaqƗ’iq are counted among the four key foundational primers (mutǌn) of the ণanafƯ School. TanwƯr alAb܈Ɨr occupies a parallel position to them, incorporating issues addressed by later scholars); 2 SHAYKH
NIAࡃM ET AL., AL-FATƖWƖ AL-HINDƮYA 257 (2000) (Leb.) (compiled by around 400 scholars under the
supervision of Shaykh NiƗm BurhƗnpǌrƯ and known as FATƖWƖ ‘ƖLAMGƮRƮ in the Indian Subcontinent, after the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb Alamgir (d. 1118/1707), who commissioned its compilation).
48. In the words of al-MarghƯnƗnƯ and Zayn al-DƯn (or Zayn al-‘ƖbidƯn) Ibn IbrƗhƯm Ibn Muhammad Ibn Nujaym: “li-anna al-qaڲƗ’a ya‘tamidu al-wilƗya”; 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at
153; 5 IBN NUJAYM, AL-BAণR AL-RƖ’IQ SHARণ KANZ AL-DAQƖ’IQ 168 (1998) (India). Fakhr al-DƯn
al-Zayla‘Ư states “anna al-qaڲƗ’a yastad‘Ư al-wilƗya wa ya‘tamidu-hƗ.” 4 AL-ZAYLA‘Ʈ, TABYƮN ALণAQƖ’IQ SHARণ KANZ AL-DAQƖ’IQ 135 (2000) (Leb.). Badr al-DƯn al-‘AynƯ states: “lƗ qaڲƗ’a bi-dǌn
al-wilƗya.” 7 AL-‘AYNƮ, AL-BINƖYA SHARণ AL-HIDƖYA 204 (2000) (Leb.). Similar wording used is “lƗ
wilƗyata la-nƗ ‘alƗ ahl al-ۊarb.”
49. 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48; 4 ALZAYLA‘Ʈ, supra note 48; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 276.
50. 4 AL-ZAYLA‘Ʈ, supra note 48; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47. If there is a peace treaty with a
particular non-Muslim land then it is possible for some form of discretionary punishment (ta’zƯr) to be
carried if the specifics of the treaty lay this out.
51. 7 AL-‘AYNƮ, supra note 48, at 203–04; 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153; 4 ALZAYLA‘Ʈ, supra note 48, at 135–36; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48.
52. 7 AL-‘AYNƮ, supra note 48, at 204 (al-‘AynƯ mentions that mustaqbal is in opposition to
actions committed in DƗr al-IslƗm); 6 AL-ণASKAFƮ, DURR AL-MUKHTƖR SHARণ TANWƮR AL-ABৡƖR
277; 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47.
53. 6 KAMƖL AL-DƮN MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HUMƖM, FATণ AL-QADƮR SHARণ AL-HIDƖYA 17–18
(2003); 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 169.
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to the aforementioned reason of committing to Islamic rulings in the future (iltazama aۊkƗm al-islƗm fƯ’l-mustaqbal).54 The issue is somewhat
different if both parties are non-Muslims but convert to Islam and enter
DƗr al-IslƗm; in that case, the judge will decree that the property owed
must be returned. Here, the jurists look at the concept of iltizƗm (commitment) again, and hold that in this case the occurrence of the debt is valid
jurisdictionally as the act took place with the agreement of both parties
accepting and submitting to the laws of Islam. Hence, the jurisdiction required for the qƗڲƯ to adjudicate is established at the time of pronouncing
the decree as both had committed (iltizƗm) themselves to the laws of Islam.55
Along with misappropriated property, the issue of murder is also mentioned in the interlocution with Abǌ ণanƯfa cited earlier. Expounding on
this, the jurists give the following details: if a Muslim musta’min (in nonMuslim territory) takes the life of another Muslim musta’min, whether it is
by murder (‘amadan) or by manslaughter (khaܒa’an), in both cases it would
be obligatory to pay the blood money (dƯya) from his personal wealth. In
the case of manslaughter, an expiatory act (kaffƗra) is also required. The
sentence is different from what one could face in DƗr al-IslƗm, wherein,
retaliatory slaughter (qawd/qi܈Ɨ )܈can be applied for murder. For manslaughter, blood money must be paid by the tribal group (‘Ɨqila,).56 This is
because, in DƗr al-IslƗm, the family/tribal group is held partly responsible
for the crime, as they are required to know the perpetrator’s whereabouts
and restrain him from committing such an act. With a change in territory
(tabƗyun al-darayan), however, the tribal group cannot be held responsible
for a crime that a member committed in another land.57
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 54 Side A
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54. The same applies if a Muslim embezzles the property of a non-Muslim who then coverts to
Islam and files a case in DƗr al-IslƗm; i.e. a fatwa will be issued but not a court decree.
55. 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 169; 4 ALZAYLA‘Ʈ, supra note 48, at 136–37; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47. There are some further details on the
issue of embezzled property (gha܈ab) but it is not necessary to provide them all here. One can compare
these notions with the “submission rule”, “choice of jurisdiction rule” and “special jurisdiction rules” of
the European Union Brussels Regulation. Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(1), 5(3), 23–24 2000 O.J.
(L 12) 1 (EC), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:en:PDF. See also
Mark Rosen, Choice of Law as Non Constitutional Federal Law, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
56. ‘Ɩqila refers to the male relatives of the perpetrator responsible for paying the bloodwite. For
the ণanafƯs, it includes soldiers of the same regiment or traders of the same market (or wherever else
solidarity can be established). See KitƗb al-JinƗyƗt in the sources supra note 55. For a general account
of Islamic criminal law and its application in different contexts see RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005).
57. 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153; 6 IBN AL-HUMƖM, supra note 53, at 19–20; 7 AL‘AYNƮ, supra note 48, at 205; 5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 169; 4 AL-ZAYLA‘Ʈ, supra note 48, at
137; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 277–78.
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58. Qur’an, 4:92.
59. See supra note 57.
60. ۉadd, pl. ۊudǌd (lit. “limits”) are the restrictive ordinances or statutes of God that have fixed
punishments in the Shari‘a. They are illicit intercourse (punishable by death by stoning or one hundred
lashes), making an unproven accusation of intercourse/defamation (eighty lashes), drinking wine (forty
or eighty lashes), theft (amputation of the hand/limbs), highway robbery (death by crucifixion or sword
if it includes murder, otherwise the same punishment as theft applies). Each has very a specific definition that determines whether a crime constitutes a ۊadd and there are strict evidentiary requirements
also. See PETERS, supra note 56, at 53–64.
61. 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47.
62. 7 AL-‘AYNƮ, supra note 48, at 206; 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153; 1 AL-NASAFƮ,
supra note 47, at 595; 4 AL-ZAYLA‘Ư, supra note 48, at 138–39; 6 IBN AL-HUMƖM, supra note 53, at 20;
5 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 169–170.
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ণanafƯs do not, however, excuse the expiatory act because the
Qur’anic verse pertaining to manslaughter (which states “[w]hoever kills
another believer must free a believing slave”)58 is without restriction
(muܒlaq). Hence, the ruling of expiation would apply irrespective of locationʊwhether it is DƗr al-IslƗm or DƗr al-ۉarb. As for the blood money,
the jurists assert that a Muslim maintains the protection and inviolability of
his life if he enters non-Muslim territory with a security covenant, because
the inviolability here (even if to a lesser extent) is established from the
protection of Dvr al-Islvm (li-anna al-‘i܈mata al-thƗbita bi’l-iۊrƗz bi-dƗr
al-islƗm). Retaliatory slaughter, however, is impossible to execute unless
the state has the power to do so. This can only exist with a Muslim sovereign (imam/caliph) in place who rules over Muslim subjects. Because this
is not the case with DƗr al-ۉarb (non-Muslim land), the ruling of retaliatory slaughter cannot be applied.59 Some of the jurists emphasize the point of
jurisdiction again, paralleling this to the fact that ۊadd punishments60 are
nullified in the case of adultery and theft in the absence of Muslim sovereignty.61
If the case involves two Muslim prisoners in DƗr al-ۉarb, and one
takes the life of the other, or if a Muslim trader (i.e. with a security covenant) takes the life of a Muslim prisoner, then the murderer will not be
punished except that an expiatory act would be required in the case of manslaughter. The same ruling is given if a Muslim kills another Muslim who
converted to Islam in non-Muslim territory.62
In the above cases, the emphasis that the ণanafƯ School places on territory and jurisdiction is readily observable. An important concept of the
inviolability (‘i܈ma) of life and property is highlighted in the juristic discussion of Islam in non-Muslim territory. The other schools and also Abǌ
Yǌsuf (d. 182/798, who is one of Abǌ ণanƯfa’s two most prominent students), while not entirely rejecting territorial jurisdiction and inviolability,
give far less significance to its effect in non-Muslim lands. They argue that
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63. For al-ShƗfi‘Ưs view, see 7 AL-SHƖFI‘Ʈ, supra note 24, at 354–55. For the view of MƗlik, see
16 SAণNǋN, supra note 31, at 91. For the ণanbalƯ position, see IBN QUDƖMA, supra note 30, at 218,
473–74. All three discuss the application of Islamic punishments (ۊudǌd and qi܈Ɨs) for infractions of
criminal law. Note that the the schools differ on whether (and which) punishments can be applied if the
imam or army chief (vested with authority) is present among an army in a non-Muslim land.
64. 6 ‘AlƗ’ AL-DƮN ABǋ BAKR AL-KƖSƖNƮ, BADƖ’I‘ AL-SANƖ’I‘ FƮ TARTƮB AL-SHARƖ’I‘ 69
(1998) (India).
65. AL-SARAKHSƮ, supra note 13, at 62; 7 AL-‘AYNƮ, supra note 48, at 205; 4 AL-ZAYLA‘Ʈ, supra
note 48, at 138–39; 6 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 278.
66. Id.
67. 2 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 153.
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the laws of God and His Messenger apply to Muslims in absolute terms,
irrespective of place (dƗr/makƗn) and time.63 In the aforementioned case,
where the Muslim with a security covenant kills another Muslim with the
same territorial status, those schools state that retaliatory slaughter is obligatory in the case of murder (‘amad). Al-ShƗfi‘Ư, for example, maintained
that there should be no distinction between the punishment for a Muslim
killed in Muslim territory or non-Muslim territory.64 The ণanafƯs, however,
state that inviolability stems from territory, not from religion (al-iۊrƗz bi’ldƗr lƗ bi’l-dƯn). They do, nevertheless, split the inviolability into two categories: (i) al-‘i܈ma al-muqawwima, which is tied to territory; and (ii) al‘i܈ma al-mu’aththima, which is tied to religion.65 So, when Abǌ ণanƯfa
states that there is nothing due on a Muslim trader that kills a prisoner or a
Muslim convert, it is because the inviolability of life and property that was
previously available to him in DƗr al-IslƗm has been waived upon entering
non-Muslim territory. However, the religious inviolability is not waived as
long as he is a Muslim, meaning that the sin (ithm) remains for committing
the crime and contravening the covenant of security, even though the Islamic punishment does not (muqawwima).66 Thus, the ণanafƯs differentiate
between legal obligation that is connected with DƗr al-IslƗm and moral
obligation that is connected with Islam.
The above discussion on the jurisdiction of DƗr al-IslƗm demonstrates
the complexity involved if someone violates the security covenant. One
matter of particular importance understood from the above juristic discourse is that Muslim jurists envisaged Muslims sojourning to non-Islamic
territory for temporary periods only. When looking at the case of a Muslim
with a security covenant who murders another Muslim with a security covenant, a reason for maintaining the penalty of blood money is because the
jurists treated his visit to non-Muslim lands as temporary, with the idea that
he would return back to his homeland in the not-too-distant future. This can
be discerned from al-MarghƯnƗnƯ’s use of the word “‘Ɨriڲ,” (contingency)
indicating a temporary cause for visiting non-Muslim territory.67 This
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would also explain why they often addressed Muslims in DƗr al-ۉarb as
traders. Hence, some jurists mentioned that since there is an intention of
returning to DƗr al-IslƗm, it is supposed (taqdƯran) that he was in Dar alIslam because that is his permanent residence. DƗr al-IslƗm is then able to
fulfill some of its obligations to the murdered person.68 The jurists did not
discuss the case of a Muslim who does not enter non-Muslim territory for
temporary purposes, but is rather a permanent resident in non-Muslim
lands.69 One can only presume that because he has no legal connection with
DƗr al-IslƗm, the Islamic state would not be able to apply any of its rulings
for crimes committed outside of DƗr al-IslƗm,70 as the protection it offers
to the life and property of Muslims would not exist.
IV. INDEPENDENT ISLAMIC JURISDICTION IN NON-MUSLIM LANDS
AND APPOINTING JUDGES

01/14/2015 15:25:42

68. 7 AL-‘AYNƮ, supra note 48, at 205.
69. Id.
70. Apart from the Muslim having to offer an expiatory act, as this is not dependent on territory
but rather an absolute verse of the Qur’an as mentioned earlier, the same expiatory is required for
intentional breaking of the fast, breaking an oath, etc., irrespective of territory.
71. See, e.g., 3 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 66. For an analysis in English, see also
Mustafa R. K. Baig, A Fatwa on Usury in the Context of British Society (2005) (unpublished M.A.
dissertation, University of Manchester) (on file with author).
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Many of these principles form the basis for spreading rulings across
other sections of Islamic jurisprudence outside the section on siyar and
jihad. In financial law, for example, the ণanafƯs—who are the specific
focus of this section—hold that transactions that are otherwise prohibited
(al-‘uqǌd al-fƗsida) in DƗr al-IslƗm become permissible in DƗr al-ۉarb. In
standard ণanafƯ texts, one can find a ruling (based on a prophetic tradition)
which states, “There is no usury between a Muslim and a non-Muslim in
DƗr al-ۉarb.” This is because a Muslim sovereign cannot extend extraterritorial protection to those living outside DƗr al-IslƗm; hence, their property is violable and unprotected (mubƗ ۊand ghayr maۊfǌܲ).71
In the section on judiciary in Islamic jurisprudence (KitƗb alQaڲƗ’/Adab al-QƗڲƯ), Muslim scholars have also discussed independent
jurisdiction within non-Muslim territory. That is, Muslim scholars have
also elaborated on how jurisdiction is established and forms within nonMuslim lands (rather than the extension of DƗr al-IslƗm’s jurisdiction in
DƗr al-ۉarb, which was described in the previous section). For example,
ণanafƯ jurists addressed the question of appointing Muslim judges in nonMuslim lands and the judicial authority that would be vested in them. A
dictate from a standard ণanafƯ manual of jurisprudence (matn) states that
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“[i]t is permissible to accept the position of qaڲƗ’ from a just or tyrannical
ruler.”72 From this short statement, a discussion among jurists emerges with
respect to a particular part of this legal rule. The characteristics of a just
(‘Ɨdil) ruler were quite straightforward, but the definition of a tyrant, or
“jƗ’ir,” was more complex.
The permissibility of a tyrannical ruler to appoint judges is first exemplified by citing a precedent of the sultanate of Mu‘ƗwƯya Ibn AbƯ SufyƗn
(d. 60/680) over parts of the Islamic empire.73 In it, the Companions
(܇aۊƗba) of the Prophet and their successors (tƗbi‘ǌn) accepted judicial
positions during his tyrannical reign, to go along with the early generations
of Muslims accepting such posts in the reign of al-ণajjƗj Ibn Yǌsuf (d.
95/714).74 A very interesting dimension is added by some jurists in their
exploration of the term jƗ’ir. ‘AlƗ’ al-DƯn al-ণaskafƯ (d. 1088/1677), citing
earlier scholars such as MiskƯn (d. 907/1501-2), states that the term can
also be extended to a non-Muslim.75 Looking at MiskƯn’s original passage,
he takes a linguistic view of the term, in that it refers to a tyrant in the “absolute sense” (ܲƗlim muܒlaqan)ʊregardless of whether the tyrant is a Muslim or a non-Muslim. MiskƯn attributes his position back to the KitƗb al-A܈l
of Muhammad al-ShaybƗnƯ.76 In explaining MiskƯn’s view, Abǌ al-Su‘ǌd
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72. “Yajǌzu taqallud al-qaڲƗ’ min al-sulܒƗn al-‘Ɨdil wa’l-jƗ’ir.” 2 AL-NASAFƮ, KANZ ALDAQƖ’IQ, supra note 47, at 110; 8 AL-TAMARTƖSHƮ, supra note 47, at 43.
73. The unjust part of Mu‘ƗwƯya Ibn AbƯ SufyƗn’s rule that is being referred to is when he set
himself up as a rebellious leader in opposition to the righteous/rightful caliph of the time, ‘AlƯ Ibn AbƯ
৫Ɨlib (the fourth legitmate “Rightly-Guided Caliph”; d. 40/661). During that period there were Companions of the Prophet that accepted judicial office. Later, ণasan Ibn ‘AlƯ (d. 50/670)—after succeeding
his father as the fifth Rightly-Guided Caliph of Islam—relinquished power to Mu‘ƗwƯya in 41/661 after
a peace treaty was forged between the two parties, and his leadership thereafter is considered legitimate
(and not a rebellion).
74. Al-ণajjƗj Ibn Yǌsuf was a powerful Umayyad administrator (governing over large parts of
the Umayyad empire) infamous for his brutality and oppression. The wisdom behind this ruling is that
even if the rulers are unjust, then judges could at least dispense justice in society in their own capacities.
The condition that a judge is able to perform his duties with justice is attached to the permissibility of
accepting such positions. 3 AL-MARGHƮNƖNƮ, supra note 16, at 102; 8 AL-ণASKAFƮ, supra note 47, at
44.
75. 8 AL-ণASKAFƮ, supra note 47, at 43.
76. 3 MU‘ƮN AL-DƮN MULLƖ MISKƮN HARAWƮ FARƖHƮ (sometimes known by his pen name
“Mu‘ƯnƯ”), SHARণ MULLƖ MISKƮN ‘ALƖ KANZ AL-DAQƖ’IQ 26 (n.d.) (photocopy without publisher
information, printed with its commentary in 3 ABǋ AL-SU‘ǋD SAYYID MUHAMMAD IBN ‘ALƮ ALণUSAYNƮ, FATণULLƖH AL-MU‘ƮN ‘ALƖ SHARণ MULLƖ MISKƮN (n.d.)). MiskƯn’s view is also mentioned
in 6 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 461. Al-FatƗwƗ al-HindƯyya cites the view in reference to alMultaqa ܒin 3 AL-FATƖWƖ AL-HINDƮYA, supra note 47, at 295. Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn al-BarƝlwƯ al-HindƯ
cites both MiskƯn and al-Multaqaܒ, in 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN AL-BARƜLWƮ AL-HINDƮ, AL-‘A৫ƖYƖ ALNABAWƮYA FƮ’L-FATƖWƖ AL-RIঋAWƮYA 545 (2000) (Pak.). KitƗb al-A܈l (also known as al-Mabsǌ )ܒis
among the six authoritative texts compiled by Muhammad al-ShaybƗnƯ in which (mainly) the opinions
of Abǌ ণanƯfa, Abǌ Yǌsuf and his own are narrated. The texts belong to the classification of ܲƗhir alriwƗyƗt and form the structural authority of the ণanafƯ School, as the narrations have been reliably
established from the author through mass transmission or well-known reports. Legal opinions that
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contradict the ܲƗhir al-riwƗyƗt are thus dismissed. The other five works are: al-JƗmi‘ al-KabƯr, al-JƗmi‘
al-܇aghƯr, al-Siyar al-KabƯr, al-Siyar al-܇aghƯr and al-ZiyƗdƗt.
77. 3 ABǋ AL-SU‘ǋD, supra note 76, at 26.
78. Al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya, authored primarily by ‘Ɩlim Ibn al-‘UlƗ’ al-AndrƯtƯ al-DehlawƯ
(d. 786/1384) and about 30 other authors, in 8 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 43; 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ
KHƖN, supra note 76, at 546–47. My personal copy of al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya (published in Karachi) is incomplete from which the chapter concerning judges (KitƗb Adab al-QƗڲƯ) is missing. I have
also checked a copy from another publisher (Beirut) and the same section is missing.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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(who wrote a commentary on MiskƯn’s work), states that this notion deems
valid the sultanate of a non-Muslim over Muslims and establishes the validity of such a ruler to appoint a person to the judiciary. According to this
view, Islam is not a condition to establish rule; since it is valid for a nonMuslim to appoint judges, it is also valid for a non-Muslim to remove
them.77
Another text, al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya, also mentions that Islam is
not a condition for the sovereign to appoint judges and adds some interesting points relating to Muslim sovereignty, governance, and judiciary. It
mentions that when lands come into the possession of non-Muslims, but the
judicial affairs remain with the Muslims, such countries will still be classed
as Islamic lands (bilƗd al-islƗm) because the judges are Muslim and nonIslamic (kufr) laws are not prevalent there.78 The underlying notion is that
the lands are only occupied by non-Muslims for a temporary period, and
there is an expectation that sovereignty will return to the Muslims. The
FatƗwƗ adds a general point about Muslim rulers that are subservient to
non-Muslims; it states that those that are subservient out of compulsion are
still Muslims, but those that are without compulsion will be considered
transgressors.79
Next, there is mention of cities that have Muslim governors appointed
by non-Muslims. The FatƗwƗ states that, because of the jurisdiction that
they hold there, it is permissible for those judges to perform the Friday and
‘Ʈd congregational prayers as well as to collect land taxes (kharƗj), appoint
judges, and marry off orphans.80 This ruling is significant because these
acts must be undertaken by the Muslim sovereign/authority. It is normally
among the conditions of the Friday and ‘Ʈd prayers, for example, that the
prayers must be led by the sovereign (imam/caliph), or by one of his appointees/governors (wƗlƯ). In the ruling above, even though the governors/officials are not appointed by a Muslim sovereign, but are appointed
by a non-Muslim, they are permitted to administer the Friday and ‘Ʈd prayers.
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In case one wonders whether the jurists only discussed those territories that are in some way occupied or dominated by non-Muslims or
whether they discussed such lands that were essentially non-Muslim without some form of political involvement or engagement between the Muslim
and non-Muslim polities, an answer seems to appear in the following passage from al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya, which states:
As for those lands where non-Muslims rule, the Muslims are permitted to
undertake the performance of Friday and ‘Ʈd [prayers] and judges will be
[recognized as official] judges with the [collective] agreement of the
Muslims. It is necessary for the Muslims to request a Muslim governor
from the non-Muslim rulers.81

The distinct feature of the above is that it refers to lands where complete authority and control lies with non-Muslims, whether such lands were
previously Muslim, or if they were lands always under non-Muslim rule.
Although the text consists only of a few lines, it contains matters of importance for Muslims living in non-Muslim countries today in that it provides a basis for performing the Jumu‘a and ‘Ʈd prayers as well as
managing other affairs through the appointment of judges. One may assume that the above passage does not specifically state that the following
refers to countries that have permanently and entirely remained under nonMuslim rule, but because this new subject item mentions countries under
non-Muslim rule without any other condition, one could be assured that it
is inclusive of non-Muslim countries (such as the United States) if one
wishes to apply the ruling in that way. What is being said is that Muslims
should appoint their own authority, who is then the locum tenens of a judge
or Islamic sovereign (ۊƗkim shar‘Ư).

The renowned ণanafƯ jurist Ibn al-HumƗm comments on the ruling in
HidƗya, and found in the works of other jurists, that it is only permissible
to accept judgeships from a tyrannical ruler when one knows that the duty

01/14/2015 15:25:42

81. Id. In Ibn ‘ƖbidƯn’s citation of al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya, he states at the end of the quote
that MiskƯn has attributed the above to al-A܈l (of Muhammad al-ShaybƗnƯ), although I have shown that
here MiskƯn’s discussion is limited to the definition of jƗ’ir and that it includes non-Muslims (this shall
be discussed in more detail later). He also says this is similar to what is mentioned in JƗmi‘ alFu܈ǌlayn. See BADR AL-DƮN MAণMǋD IBN ISRƖ‘ƮL AL-SHAHƮR BI-IBN QƖঋƮ SAMƖWUNA, JƖMI‘ ALFUৡǋLAYN 11 (1882) (Egypt). The original text is indeed similar to al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya with the
exception of the first two points—that Islam is not a condition for the sultanate and the question of
lands being occupied by non-Muslims. It would be interesting to discover whether the views found in
JƗmi‘ al-Fu܈ǌlayn and al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya were generated from within the legal-literary tradition or whether the special situation of fourteen and fifteenth century Ottoman Turkey (in the case of
Badr al-DƯn SamƗwuna) and thirteen and fourteenth century India (in the case of al-FatƗwƗ alTƗtƗrkhƗnƯya) might have impacted the texts here. This, however, would require a separate study.
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82. See supra note 74.
83. 7 IBN AL-HUMƖM, supra note 53, at 246. His view is also cited in 6 IBN NUJAYM, supra note
48, at 461, and slightly summarized in 8 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 43–44.
84. Id.
85. I have adopted the categories from ImƗm Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn al-BarƝlwƯ with slight variations
in order to keep the discussion more coherent. See 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN, supra note 76, at 547.
Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn gives the corresponding Arabic words from the text to point out where each block of
text from the legal sources starts and ends to denote each category. I should mention here that Aতmad
RiঌƗ KhƗn’s fatwa, which is essentially a monograph on the appointment of judges in British India,
warrants a separate research project; in it he makes the distinction between shar‘Ư and ‘urfƯ jurisdiction.
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could be carried out rightfully and fairly.82 He discusses a situation where
there is neither a sultan, nor anyone who is permitted to appoint judges,
pointing out that this is currently the situation found in some Muslim countries (in his time) where non-Muslims have taken control, “such as Cordoba
today and Valenica in the Maghreb, and Abyssinia.”83 In such circumstances, they should appoint Muslims from among themselves to collect taxes,
and they are required to agree on a person whom they will make a governor
(wƗlƯ); then the governor shall appoint a judge who shall adjudicate among
them. Similarly, they should appoint an imam who shall lead the Friday
prayer.84
Before discussing the above, it is useful to summarize the above texts
and make clear the various scenarios that the jurists have discussed. Thus,
in light of the juristic discourse, one can identify three categories of places
with respect to the appointment of judges: (1) those countries where the
sovereign is Muslim but the Muslim government is under the authority of
non-Muslims; (2) those places that attain independent judicial authority but
the sovereign is non-Muslim (and the sovereign has appointed Muslim
governors); and (3) those lands that are ruled entirely by non-Muslims; the
sovereign and all other administrative positions are held by non-Muslims.85
Returning to the ruling of Ibn al-HumƗm from the three categories
mentioned above, he is describing the third category. This is comparable to
the last part of the TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya text. For purposes of clarity, both statements cited earlier are juxtaposed here: “As for those countries where nonMuslims rule . . .” (al-FatƗwƗ al-TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya) and “[w]here there is no
sultan, nor one for whom it is permitted to appoint judges . . .” (Ibn alHumƗm, Fat ۊal-QadƯr).
The text of TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya left the statement open, but Ibn al-HumƗm,
after stating the general point about lands where no sultan exists, exemplifies the matter in reference to lands that have been taken over by nonMuslims (such as Cordoba). He does not specifically refer to lands that
have always been non-Muslim, probably because classical jurists did not
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86. See SIRƖJ AL-DƮN ‘UMAR IBN IBRƖHƮM IBN NUJAYM, AL-NAHR AL-FƖ‘IQ ৡHARণ KANZ ALDAQƖ’IQ (2002) (Leb.) (Not to be confused with his elder brother, Zayn al-DƯn Ibn Nujaym, author of
al-Baۊr al-RƗ’iq, who died in 970/1563, supra note 48).
87. Jurists use the term mu‘tamad ‘alay-hi to signify the opinion (from among other opinions)
which the school depends upon.
88. 8 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 44.
89. 6 IBN NUJAYM, supra note 48, at 461; JƖMI‘ AL-FUৡǋLAYN in 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN, supra
note 76, at 542.
90. 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN, supra note 76, at 545–46. I was not able to find the quote in al-A܈l in
the edition published by DƗ’irƗt al-Ma‘Ɨrif, Hyderabad in 1966, edited by Abǌ’l-WafƗ al-AfghƗnƯ;
perhaps a more thorough look may unveil it or another manuscript or published edition may reveal the
actual text.
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envisage Muslims to be residing in such lands. Thus, Ibn al-HumƗm gave
the example of a practical problem affecting the Muslims at that time.
Both parts of the text discuss the same issue. Nevertheless, Ibn alHumƗm’s passage is sometimes presented by jurists after the citation of
TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya as a statement in opposition to the former, although, Ibn alHumƗm himself does not explicitly rebut the views of any earlier jurists.
The point of difference between the jurists lies in who is eligible to appoint
judges. One of the last major authorities of the school, Ibn ‘ƖbidƯn (d.
1252/1836), quotes SirƗj al-DƯn Ibn Nujaym’s (d. 1005/1596) al-Nahr alFƗ‘iq86 as saying that the position of Ibn al-HumƗm is “satisfying and
should be depended on.”87 Ibn ‘ƖbidƯn states that this is referring to Ibn alHumƗm’s position regarding the invalidity of non-Muslims appointing
judges (‘adam siۊۊat taqallud al-qaڲƗ’ min kƗfir), which is contrary to
what has been mentioned in TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya.88 The disagreement is that a
non-Muslim authority cannot appoint judges; it is only this element of
TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya that is disagreed upon. In a similar fashion, the elder Ibn
Nujaym (Zayn al-DƯn) cites MiskƯn’s view (which is the same view held in
TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya) regarding the permissibility of accepting judgeships from
non-Muslim rulers. After making clear that Ibn al-HumƗm opposed this, he
states that the view of Ibn al-HumƗm is corroborated by the text of JƗmi‘
al-Fu܈ǌlayn (which does not mention that it is permissible to accept judicial positions from non-Muslims).89
As noted earlier, MiskƯn referenced his view to al-A܈l (also called alMabsǌ )ܒof Muhammad al-ShaybƗnƯ. As such, this position is attributed to
the most authoritative works of the ণanafƯ School. In later years, the Indian
jurisprudent, Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn al-BarƝlwƯ (d. 1340/1921), investigated the
matter further. He traced the original text of al-A܈l, finding that the quote is
cited in the chapter of prayer (KitƗb al-܇alƗh) in Radd al-MuۊtƗr (with
reference to another text, Mi‘rƗj al-DirƗya).90 Interestingly, Aতmad RiঌƗ
KhƗn finds that there is no mention of what MiskƯn has ascribed to it. The
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B. Where it is not Possible to Officially Appoint a Governor or Judge
The above scenarios are not ones that are found in the United States or
elsewhere, such as in Europe. Presently, there are no Islamic judges in official judicial positions,93 nor is there any concept of a Muslim governor who
would appoint a judge over the Muslims. Late ণanafƯ jurists have discussed
this situation and suggest that Muslims should appoint a scholar competent

01/14/2015 15:25:42

91. See 8 IBN ‘ƖBIDƮN, supra note 47, at 43.
92. Id. at 44.
93. By Islamic judges, I am referring to judges that apply Shari‘a rulings and not judges that are
Muslim and apply the secular law of the land (of which there are many).
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text is very similar to what is found in TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya, except for the opening
line, which states that Islam is not a condition for the sultanate. The only
significant point it adds is that, for those lands where governors have been
appointed by a non-Muslim sovereign (the second category mentioned
earlier), Islamic penal laws (ۊudǌd) can also be implemented there as well
as the Friday and ‘Ʈd prayers. Again, this is because of the administrative
power and jurisdiction that Muslims possess there.91 If the findings of
Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn are to be accepted by all subsequent jurists then not only
should Ibn al-HumƗm’s opinion be depended upon, as mentioned by Ibn
‘ƖbidƯn, but rather it will become the authoritative or official ruling of the
school.
It is necessary to unpack the various layers of textual discussion here
because of the implications it might have on modern juristic discourse in
countries like the United States. If the view of TƗtƗrkhƗnƯya and MiskƯn is
adopted, then it would be legally possible (from a shar‘Ư point of view) for
U.S. governments to appoint Islamic judges in America. The majority of
jurists, however, rule that it is not possible, and that judges shall only be
appointed by the choice and agreement of the Muslims. Nevertheless, Ibn
‘ƖbidƯn adds an interesting point: if a non-Muslim sovereign designates a
judge over them and the Muslims accept it, then such an appointment is
undoubtedly valid.92
Therefore, in a modern United States or Western context, and in the
discussion regarding the implementation of certain elements of Islamic law
and incorporating them into the legal system, two options are available for
discussion from an Islamic (ণanafƯ) juristic point of view. The Muslims
either nominate a person to adjudicate among them or the government proposes a person who is appointed on the condition that the Muslims are satisfied with such a person’s appointment to office.
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in Islamic jurisprudence, who is upright and of the correct Sunni faith, as a
sort of de facto judge.94 In fact, ‘Abd al-GhanƯ al-NƗbulusƯ (d. 1143/1731),
refers back to a sixth/twelfth century legist who covered the subject conclusively:
When the era is void of an appropriate sultan [to administer the affairs of
his Muslim subjects], then the ‘ulamƗ’ (scholars) will be empowered [to
administer their affairs] and it is necessary upon the umma (Muslim
community) to take recourse to these scholars. The scholars will become
governors. If it is difficult for all of them to take recourse to one scholar
then each region should independently adhere to their [local] scholars. If
there are many [scholars in one area] then the most knowledgeable
among them should be followed. If they are all equal [in knowledge]
then [one should be selected] by casting lots among them.95

The issue in this case is comparatively straightforward, and no difference of opinion within the school has been cited here. In fact, a similar
concept can be found among the other schools so it is not restricted to
ণanafƯ legal thinking.96 It delegates the legal affairs of Muslims to competent Muslim scholars in society. Although the above passage does not define the scope of which areas of Shari‘a are to be administered by scholars,
later ণanafƯ scholars (such as Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn writing in British India)
have outlined a practical set of areas that should be governed by Muslim
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94. 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN, supra note 76, at 549. I have obtained an unpublished fatwa from the
late ণanafƯ Mufti Ghulam Rasool who lived in London (on file with author). He similarly states that in
those places where there is no Islamic sovereign, reliable and trustworthy scholars are representative or
the locum tenens of an Islamic sovereign.
95. 1 SAYYID ‘ABD AL-GHANƮ IBN ISMƖ‘ƮL AL-NƖBULUSƮ, AL-ণADƮQA AL-NADƮYA SHARণ AL৫ARƮQA AL-MUণAMMADƮYA 351 (1994) (Turkey). His reference is to al-‘A৬৬Ɨbi, that is Abǌ Naৢr
Aতmad Ibn Muhammad al-‘A৬৬ƗbƯ al-BukhƗrƯ (d. 586/1190). Although the passage does not specify
non-Muslim lands and may well have been written in the context of Muslim lands without appropriate
rulers, the fact that the statement is general (“when the era is void”) has allowed the contemporary
mufti mentioned above (Ghulam Rasool) to cite the passage in his fatwa addressing Muslims in Britain,
and Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn to cite it in the context of British India (18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN, supra note 77,
at 549-50). Couple this with rulings cited above that non-Muslims can appoint judges.
96. Al-JuwaynƯ (d. 478/1085Ȅwriting a century before al-‘AttƗbƯ), for example, states something
similar to the above passage from al-NƗbulusƯ. IMƖM ƖL-ণARAMAYN ABǋ AL-MA‘ƖLƮ ‘ABD AL-MALIK
AL-JUWAYNƮ, GHIYƖTH AL-UMAM FƮ ILTIYƖTH AL-ULAM 280–83 (1979) (Egypt). Although he belongs
to the ShƗfi‘Ư School, GhiyƗth al-Umam (also known as al-GhiyƗthƯ) is a work of the Islamic governance genre (al-siyƗsa al-shari‘Ưya/al-fikr (al-fiqh) al-siyƗsƯ al-islƗmƯ) akin to the contemporaneous alAۊkƗm al-SulܒƗnƯya of al-MƗwardƯ, supra note 42, and the book of the same name (and time) by al-QƗঌi
Abǌ Ya‘lƗ (Muhamad Ibn al-ণusayn Ibn al-FarrƗ’, d. 458/1066). The contents of the book tend to
accord with the consensus of the schools, indicating that there is convergence of the schools on this
particular issue. Al-NƗbulusƯ himself in fact cites the ShƗfi‘Ư scholar Nǌr al-DƯn Abǌ al-ণasan ‘AlƯ alSamhǌdƯ (d. 911 /1506), who says that this specific type of power (al-wilƗyƗ al-khƗ܈܈a) vested in these
scholars does not negate the general obligation to follow other Muslims scholars (muܒlaqan) not vested
with such powers (this work by al-NƗbulusƯ is also not restricted to the ণanafƯ School; in fact, it would
not be considered a legal work as such because it engages with the full breath of Islamic disciplines to
provide “religious guidance” to believers). IBN ISMƖ‘ƮL AL-NƖBULUSƮ, supra note 95, at 351–52. The
scriptural basis for this obedience to scholars would stem from the Qur’anic verse (4:59): “O you who
have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger, and those in authority among you . . .”
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scholars, which would normally come under the judicial remit of an officially appointed judge. These areas of the law include leading the Friday
and ‘Ʈd prayers, sighting of the new moon (establishing the new months),
dissolving marriages (faskh al-nikƗ)ۊ, marrying orphans and others unable
to marry independently, and other areas of Islamic law that are not at conflict with, or do not face any hindrance from, the laws of the land.97
V. EVALUATING THE ISLAMIC DISCOURSE OF MUSLIMS IN
NON-MUSLIM LANDS

01/14/2015 15:25:42

97. 18 AণMAD RIঋƖ KHƖN, supra note 76, at 549. Also see, Mufti Ghulam Rasool’s fatwa
mentioned above. Aতmad RiঌƗ KhƗn is writing in the context of British India while Mufti Ghulam
Rasool’s fatwa was penned in present day London.
98. There was not sufficient space in the present article to discuss these in any detail.
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At the outset, it was noted that the Qur’an discusses emigration, and
that it is a very important part of the religious history of the early community (and for Muslims in other instances of history). The earliest Muslim
scholars addressed the social and commercial phenomenon of Muslims
traveling outside DƗr al-IslƗm and coming under non-Muslim rule. Although these Muslims were discussed in the context of traders, the legal
matters discussed with respect to those traders were not limited only to
financial transactions, but they also covered penal law and other matters.
Islamic jurists expressed a variety of attitudes toward Muslims living under
non-Muslim rule. While these opinions were largely informed by the positions of their school (madhhab), the political and social circumstances
sometimes contributed to the cementing of these positions.98
A study of the section on siyar/jihad reveals that it is not a body of literature solely concerned with hostile relations between Muslims and nonMuslims. Instead, its nature is multifaceted: not only do the jurists discuss
matters that regulate military warfare, but, in the same section, they also
discuss matters relating to peaceful abidance in non-Muslim territory. Thus,
just as Islamic law contemplates entry into non-Muslim lands through warfare, Islamic law clearly makes space for peaceful relations in non-Muslim
lands. In American public discourse, some use jihad as a catchall phrase to
encapsulate all of Shari‘a, which is clearly misguided. But, even in this
single element of the Shari‘a, misconstrued notions of jihad continue to
perpetuate. The fact that this guidance is in the section on jihad calls for a
more panoptic understanding of what the section comprises. Because of
issues arising from the wider context of jihad, discussions centered on jihad
have a wider rubric than are often assumed.
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99. There are differences among the other schools here, as alluded to earlier.
100. In the way put forward by Bernard Lewis for example. BERNARD LEWIS, THE POLITICAL
LANGUAGE OF ISLAM 71–80 (1988).
101. In terms of understanding concordance and difference among Islamic legal schools
(madhƗhib), one can observe here that on the issue of migration and residence in non-Muslim lands,
three of the schools hold the same view while the MƗlikƯs hold a distinctive one. In terms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the position of the ণanafƯ School is unique in contrast to the other three that are
in agreement.
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Although legal manuals were predominantly designed to address Muslims living in DƗr al-IslƗm, classical Islamic jurists also codified complex
and profound legal rulings pertaining to Muslims in non-Muslim lands. In
particular, one is able to discern the practical concerns of ণanafƯ jurists in
extending the jurisdiction of Islam to non-Muslim lands. While judges in
Muslim lands cannot enforce Islamic law for acts committed in nonMuslim lands because of a lack of jurisdiction (in light of a “territorialist”
or “anti-extraterritorialism” approach adopted by ণanafƯs), Islamic law
makes a subtle, yet important, qualification: a Muslim will not be relieved
from his religious sin or his moral obligations in the event of breaking the
law. Furthermore, although ণanafƯs stress that inviolability (of life and
property) stems from territory, and not from religion, DƗr al-IslƗm can still
exercise some of its judicial authority. However, this is in light of the fact
that Muslims were only conceived of as temporary sojourners to nonMuslim lands, and in the case of permanent residency, we can understand
that there would be no question of applying Islamic law in non-Muslim
lands.99 Choice-of-law questions were clearly central here to Islamic jurists
in discussing the extra-territorial jurisdiction of Islam. The division of the
world into the “Abode of Islam” and “Abode of War” was not to indicate a
permanent and necessary state of hostility,100 but contained a central concern for the principle of territorial jurisdiction, especially for the ণanafƯs.101
Contrary to the rhetoric found in sections of the media, blogosphere,
and political sphere, Muslims are not commanded to implement penal law
in non-Muslim jurisdictions. And contrary to assertions made today by
certain radical groups claiming to adhere to the Shari‘a, this paper shows
that Muslims are obliged to observe the local law of the land (which includes not harming citizens and property). Not only that, but—at least according to the ণanafƯ School—in the event of escaping legal justice for
transgressing the law in a non-Muslim country (or being the victim of an
offense), they will be deprived of all access or only receive limited access
to Islamic justice if a case is brought to a Muslim country. All the while,
Islamic law will continue to hold them responsible from a theological point
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102. See for example, BERNARD LEWIS & BUNTZIE ELLIS CHURCHILL, ISLAM: THE RELIGION AND
PEOPLE 10 (2009). Lewis basically says that Muslims came under non-Muslim rule either by
conquest or by imperialism, and the thought of voluntary emigration never entered their thoughts.
THE
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of view. According to the other schools, Islamic law will hold them responsible from both a theological and judicial-legal point of view.
In terms of independent jurisdiction in non-Muslim territories, Muslim
scholars discussed the different scenarios in which Muslims could find
themselves. Centuries ago, those jurists laid out the guidance for Muslims
living in non-Muslim lands, and detailed how they should manage their
legal affairs. The rulings perhaps go some way to address the MƗlikƯ scholars’ concerns that Muslims would be subject to non-Islamic laws. At the
heart of the jurists’ concern is the need to enunciate how Muslims could
lead a practicing Muslim life, in all the possible or practical situations that
they may face. It would not be anachronistic to assert that early Muslim
jurists provided, not only a blueprint, but in some cases, precise details to
directly address, in very practical terms, the contentiously debated issue of
Muslims being able to live by Islamic laws beyond ritual matters. This is
conceived by vesting authority in personalities that have legal and binding
power in the absence of an imam (Muslim sovereign) in non-Muslim territory. With respect to the appointment of judges and administration of Islamic law, the different scenarios addressed by the jurists depended on how
Muslims were governed. As such, they reflect different considerations that
result from the realities of the particular Muslim community. The same
process of determining the practical circumstances of Muslims can be
adopted for Muslims in the United States today, in terms of defining the
scope of Islamic jurisprudence that they need to be most immediately concerned with. Traditional jurists did not clearly delineate which areas of the
law should be administered (except the Friday and ‘Ʈd prayers), leaving it
open to the Muslims of a particular time and place.
This perhaps challenges, or provides a new perspective to, the statements made by some writers that voluntary Muslim migration to nonMuslim lands is a question that never seems to have entered the minds of
Muslim jurists and theologians.102 While the jurists do not explicitly mention voluntary migration, the fact that they were hardly concerned with the
means by which these Muslims had arrived in non-Muslim lands (except by
referring to them as traders or converts in the land), suggests that they may
have deliberately refrained from this discussion in order not to completely
restrict this activity. Permanent residency does not seem to be encouraged
in the early works. However, the detailing of rules governing the appointment of judges, which can only occur in a permanent and stable setting,
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mitigates this. The fact that traditional jurists today do not object to Muslims remaining indefinitely in non-Muslim lands, although much of the
modern migration was initially for economic reasons as it was in premodern times, also shows there was nothing explicitly prohibitive in the
sacred texts regarding emigration. This is not to mention that the home
countries of these immigrants did/do not (always) rule by God’s law.103
VI. ISLAMIC LAW IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

01/14/2015 15:25:42

103. Note the famous Hadith narrated on the authority of ‘Umar:
Actions are only [judged] by intention. And for every person is what he has intended. So
whosoever migrates for Allah and His Messenger, then his migration is for Allah and His
Messenger. And whosoever migrates for worldly affair to gain, or for a woman to marry, then
his migration is for what he has migrated for.
1 ABǋ ‘ABDULLƖH MUণAMMAD IBN ISMƖ‘ƮL AL-BUKHƖRƮ, AL-JƖMI‘ AL-ৡAHƮণ, 2 (1893-95,
reprint of the Bulaq edition) (Egypt) (Hadith report 1), and five other places in his collection; 6
ABǋ AL-ণUSAYN MUSLIM IBN AL-ণAJJƖJ, AL-JƖMI‘ AL-SAণƮH, 48 (1963, reprint of the Istanbul
edition 1911-1915) (Egypt) (Hadith report 1907); and mentioned in all major collections (with
slightly different wording). Scholars apply the Hadith unrestrictedly. Sufi travelers to non-Muslim
lands are also well-documented as well as traders who also served as ambassadors for their faith
(so improving one’s financial state was embedded within religious intentions for migrating).
104. Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 OKLA L.
REV. 431, 433 (2014).
105. Id. at 431, 434–35, 437–38.
106. Id. at 441–43. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is a federal law but since 1997 (after
the Supreme Court ruled that it could not be applied to states), 22 states have passed their own RFRAs
that apply to their individual state and local governments.
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Reviewing the different instances where Islamic law, or general Muslim practice, has been considered by American courts, one finds that no
special exemptions are granted to Muslims that are not granted to others on
the grounds of religion. Eugene Volokh has (convincingly) argued that
“[m]any other complaints about incidents of alleged ‘creeping Shari‘a’ in
American law are misguided, partly because the complaints miss the way
those incidents simply reflect well-settled (and sound) American law.”104
American law, recognizing an individual’s religious principles, provides
for freedom of contract and testamentary dispossession of property at
death. So Muslims, like Christians, Jews and others, can therefore write
contracts (including marriage) and wills to implement their understanding
of their religious obligations. Accordingly, Muslims can route their disputes to Muslim tribunals in the way others often route their disputes to
private arbitrators.105
Likewise, some of the areas where U.S. law has made provisions for
religious accommodation for Muslims in the workplace include religiously
mandated dress, such as the headscarf or modest dress, religious holidays
and objecting to carrying alcohol.106 Such cases are often covered under the
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993. There are, of course, constitutional limitations in place that prevent
the enforcement of contracts or penalties that interfere with compelling
government or safety interests.107
Government entities also provide religious accommodations that benefit employees, students or customers. Some of these include public school
holidays on religious occasions in areas where there are many Muslims,
ablution facilities in universities and airports, provision of halal food in
government run cafeterias, and government lenders offering loans that formally avoid interest.108 Courts may also deal with issues relating to private
international law involving companies based in Muslim counties (that adhere to certain laws of Islamic commerce) that operate in the United States
and/or have United States’ employees/partners. Traditional American
choice-of-law rules apply here as they would for all other interactions with
foreign laws.109
Abed Awad,110 for example, has handled over 100 cases as an attorney, consultant or expert witness involving components of Shari‘a. They
include international business contracts where courts deemed that the law
of a Muslim country applied and enforcing dower payment in an Islamic
marriage contract. U.S. courts, he notes, also refuse to recognize such orders due to constitutional and due process reasons.111 The American Civil
Liberties Union has examined similar cases and demonstrably reported that
“there is no evidence that Islamic law is encroaching on our courts. On the
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107. Id. at 435–37, 443–45.
108. These accommodations are not implemented by courts under the above acts but by other
government agencies on an ad hoc basis relative to the desires of employers, students, customers, etc.
Id. at 448.
109. See Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA L. REV. 219 (2014). In fact,
one could say that the value the United States places on the diversity found in its interstate legal system—which acts to reflect the distinctive values of citizens in each state—makes it more amenable to
accommodate foreign law. Particularly considering the fact that choice-of-law was conceptualized as a
subset of the “general commercial law” of private international law for most of the country’s history.
Although two Supreme Court rulings (in 1938 and upheld in 1941) declared a federal court sitting in
diversity should apply the substantive laws of the forum state (lex fori), Mark Rosen has argued that
choice-of-law must be re-conceptualized as federal law. See Rosen, supra note 55. There is scope here
to examine how such a framework could be useful for dealing with Islamic law (and foreign laws in
general), not only because uniformity (of choice-of-law procedures) is necessary to determine predictability, but it would also reduce political interference. Id. at 61–62 (a point pertinent to the politicized
nature of debates surrounding Islamic law mentioned above). Incidentally, the defendants in the Oklahoma case cited above contended that the “[anti-Shari’a law] amendment is merely a choice-of-law
provision that bans state courts from applying the law of other nations or cultures.” James C. McKinley
Jr., Judge Blocks Oklahoma’s Ban on Using Shariah Law in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/30oklahoma.html.
110. Awad, supra note 3.
111. Id. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, for example, already prevents courts
applying foreign, international or religious laws that violate public policy.
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contrary, the court cases cited by anti-Muslim groups as purportedly illustrative of this problem actually show the opposite.”112
There is no “special case” for Islam or a change in law that is required.
Although motivated by their faith, Muslims claimants are simply seeking
an application of American law, as is the case with people of other faiths,
such as Jews observing Halakhic law. The same principle is applied for
cases involving foreign law. The passing of such bills would thus have
wider ramifications for other U.S. citizens including the Jewish community
and those involved in international law cases.113
CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that what is required is a common sense
approach that recognizes the accommodating principles contained within
the repositories of both the American legal system and the body of Islamic
law as laid out above. Especially since there are only a very limited number
of areas where Shari‘a principles may interact with courts in the United
States in the first place.
From an Islamic point of view, the ideas discussed here provide a platform for Muslims to both engage with the continuity of the Islamic tradition, and to apply that tradition to local circumstances. Reductive
representationsȄor even constructionsȄof the “Shari‘a” in the media and
in the views of some populist politicians serves to demonstrate that they
have no grasp of Shari‘a’s potential in this area, not least the unanimity of
the jurists on living and maintaining a peaceful life under non-Muslim law
(as necessitated by the amƗn).
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112. Nothing to Fear: Debunking the Mythical “Sharia Threat” to Our Judicial System, ACLU 1
(May 2011),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Nothing_To_Fear_Report_FINAL_MAY_2011.pdf. After presenting
various cases (as Volokh does) to illustrate the point, the report concludes:
When the court cases cited by anti-Muslim groups are examined more closely, the myth of the
“Sharia threat” to our judicial system quickly disappears. Far from confirming some fabricated conspiracy, these cases illustrate that our judicial system is alive and well, and in no danger of being co-opted or taken over by Islam.
Id. at 5.
113. To see some of the “unintended consequences” and ramifications of banning Shari‘a in
courts, as well as the above sources visit: Sheila Musaji, Anti-Sharia Movements’ Unintended Consequences for Jews, Native Americans, and Others, THE AMERICAN MUSLIM (May 16, 2013),
WWW.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/anti-sharia-movements-unintendedconsquences/0018763; Robert K. Vischer, The Dangers of Anti-Sharia Laws, FIRST THINGS (Mar.
2012),
http://www.firstthings.com/index.php?permalink=article&entry_permalink=2012/03/thedangers-of-anti-sharia-laws; Ron Kampeas, Anti-Sharia Laws Stir Concerns That Halachah Could Be
Next, JTA, Apr. 28, 2011, http://www.jta.org/2011/04/28/life-religion/anti-sharia-laws-stir-concernsthat-halachah-could-be-next.
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Such a study therefore provides valuable information, resources, and
insights for approaching the contemporary debates surrounding coexistence and Muslims living in non-Muslim lands such as the United
States, in which legal affairs continue to feature prominently. This ties into
the point that Islamic law incorporates the importance of having peaceful
and pragmatic relationships with non-Muslims in non-Muslim lands, and
provides the principles to enable such peaceful relations to be maintained
for the benefit of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
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